Abstract

This dissertation presents Plato's distinctive approach in the Symposium to topics normally associated with Aristotelian ethics: practical reason, friendship, the theoretic life, and the ranking of the lives associated with political activity and philosophy. After an introductory chapter I focus on Diotima's speech in chapters 2 through 6. Eros appears as a species of desire, one that lacks its object, is self-interested, and can generate action. In addition to these basic characteristics common to other desires, eros is directed towards acquiring the good and happiness. This understanding of eros as directed towards the good and beauty while lacking the object of its desire leads to an interpretation of the ascent passage which emphasizes the lover's contingency and lack of self-sufficiency. While an Aristotelian view of the theoretic life presents it as characterized by an almost divine self-sufficiency and continuity of action, the Symposium presents a more human version of the theoretic life. The Diotiman lover does not achieve self-sufficiency or continuous activity. His desire for beauty is fulfilled only in fleeting moments of heightened awareness of the form of beauty. In addition, it shapes the lover's life and serves as a guide in the choice of lives. Further confirmation for this reading of Diotima's speech comes from the sympathetic presentation it allows of Alcibiades' speech. In chapters 7 and 8 I use this reading of the Symposium as a standpoint from which to view two important sections of the Nicamachean Ethics. In Book I of the Ethics Aristotle's account of happiness depends on his conception of self-sufficient activity. I compare his use of activity in the function argument to Diotima's use of the ergon of eros, giving birth in the beautiful, in her description of the best human life. Plato's Lysis echoes many of the themes of the Symposium. It addresses itself to an apparent tension between self-sufficiency and happiness, a tension which also motivates Aristotle's treatment of friendship in Books VIII and IX of the Ethics.