A case of confusing probability and confirmation

Synthese 184 (1):101-107 (2012)
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Abstract

Tom Stoneham put forward an argument purporting to show that coherentists are, under certain conditions, committed to the conjunction fallacy. Stoneham considers this argument a reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. I argue that Stoneham neglects the distinction between degrees of confirmation and degrees of probability. Once the distinction is in place, it becomes clear that no conjunction fallacy has been committed

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Jeanne Peijnenburg
University of Groningen