Abstract

This paper presents a challenge to enactivist approaches to cognition (e.g. Ward, D., Silverman, D. & Villalobos, M. 2017) that is based on the theoretical commitments behind forms of looking time studies that have been extensively used to probe into the cognitive abilities of infants and nonhuman animals. I briefly summarize the Violation of Expectation (VoE) paradigm (Ginnobili & Olmos 2021) to illustrate why such methods might pose a problem for enactivists and their conception of cognition as a largely representation-free dynamic coupling between organism and environment. I argue that despite the lack of clarity regarding how the notion of expectation should be applied to the minds of neonates and nonhuman animals, there is an inherently representational aspect to expectation, given that it embodies satisfaction conditions. The challenge is, then: given that many forms of enactivism seem to reject the notion of representationas it is used in the VoE literature, how can enactivists make sense of data and results obtained using such research methods?