Critical Notice of Paul Russell's Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):81-94 (1998)
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Abstract

Russell's study of Hume's theories of freedom and responsibility is the first extended treatment of these themes in the literature and shows in detail how what is regarded by most readers as merely the first statement of "compatibilism" is part of a full naturalistic analysis of praise, blame, punishment and responsibility. The notice seeks to bring out how Russell's account of Hume's view of freedom illuminates his psychology and ethics and concludes with a few "libertarian" criticisms of Hume's position

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Terence Penelhum
Last affiliation: University of Calgary

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Virtues and Vices.Philippa Foot - 1983 - Noûs 17 (1):117-121.
Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise.[author unknown] - 1966 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 22 (2):211-212.

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