Towards a sensible bifurcationism (concerning what grounds thought about particulars)

Theoria 88 (2):348-364 (2022)
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Abstract

In virtue of what are particular individuals or objects thought about? I call this the grounding question. A consensus answer is bifurcationism: objects can be thought about in virtue of both satisfactional grounds—roughly, in virtue of their unique satisfaction of conditions that figure in a subject's thought—and non-satisfactional grounds. Bifurcationism is a consensus view, but it comes in different flavours that correspond to different approaches to answering the grounding question. This paper draws on Saul Kripke's approach to linguistic reference in order to make recommendations about how to move toward a sensible bifurcationism concerning what grounds thought about particulars.

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Jessica Pepp
Uppsala University

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Individuals.P. F. Strawson - 1959 - Garden City, N.Y.: Routledge.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne, Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.

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