Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life

New York: Oxford University Press (2014)
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Abstract

Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original, forward-looking conception of moral responsibility. He argues that although we may not possess the kind of free will that is normally considered necessary for moral responsibility, this does not jeopardize our sense of ourselves as agents, or a robust sense of achievement and meaning in life

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original McKenna, Michael; Pereboom, Derk (2014) "Free Will: A Contemporary Introduction". Routledge

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Derk Pereboom
Cornell University

Citations of this work

Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
There Is No Techno-Responsibility Gap.Daniel W. Tigard - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (3):589-607.
Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt.Andreas Brekke Carlsson - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):89-115.

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References found in this work

The Soft-Line Solution to Pereboom's Four-Case Argument.Kristin Mickelson - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):595-617.

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