Is inferentialism circular?

Analysis 78 (3):450-454 (2018)
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Abstract

Variations on the argument “Inferences are moves from meaningful statements to meaningful statements; hence the meanings cannot be inferential roles” are often used as knock-down argument against inferentialism. In this short paper I indicate that the argument is simply a non sequitur.

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References found in this work

Making it Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.
What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - Studia Logica 54 (1):132-133.
Categories of Art.Kendall L. Walton - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (3):334-367.

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