Moral Objectivity, Simplicity, and the Identity View of God

Philosophia Christi 11 (1):126-144 (2009)
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Abstract

In contrast to the most common view, I argue that one can consistently affirm that fundamental moral principles are objective and invariable, and yet are dependent on God. I explore and reject appealing to divine simplicity as a basis for affirming this conjunction. Rather, I develop the thesis that God is identical to the Good (the Identity View or IV) and argue that the IV does not fall to the criticisms of simplicity. I then consider a divine will theory (DWT) that claims moral principles are grounded in God’s will. When the IV is conjoined with a DWT, there is reason to affirm an objective, theistically based ethics. The IV and DWT proposed here are models and while I attempt to increase their plausibility, I do not argue for their truth. The IV conjoined with a moral theory such as DWT explains the dependence of moral principles on God, while allowing for objectivity since morality is rooted in the eternal unchanging standard of the Good.

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Gordon Pettit
Western Illinois University

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References found in this work

.Eleonore Stump (ed.) - 1993 - Cornell Univ Pr.
Is God an abstract object?Brian Leftow - 1990 - Noûs 24 (4):581-598.
What Euthyphro Should Have Said.William P. Alston - 2002 - In William Lane Craig (ed.), Philosophy of religion: a reader and guide. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. pp. 283-298.
Divine Command, Divine Will, and Moral Obligation.Mark C. Murphy - 1998 - Faith and Philosophy 15 (1):3-27.
On God and Mann: A View of Divine Simplicity.Thomas V. Morris - 1985 - Religious Studies 21 (3):299 - 318.

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