Abstract

The present study focuses on the so-called ‘fallacy of combination and division’ or ‘synthetic-dieretic fallacy,’ as discussed by Aristotle in his treatises ‘Rhetoric’ and ‘On Sophistical Refutations.’ Despite significant scholarly interest in these manipulative maneuvers over the last two decades, there is no agreement regarding the notable discrepancies observed in the two works regarding defini- tions and the examples the philosopher employs to illustrate them. The thesis to be defended is that these are not two entirely different phenomena but rather two dis- tinct approaches applied by Aristotle to refute the paradoxes used in the Megarian school of philosophy to seemingly disprove the concept of the static (εἶναι) nature of being and ‘prove’ their idea of an eternally changing dynamic world (γίγνεσθαι). A new approach will be proposed towards the specific argumentative fallacies and linguistic means underlying the logic-linguistic phenomena described by Aristotle.