Updating on the evidence of others

Philosophical Studies 181 (10):2539-2562 (2024)
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Abstract

One often learns the opinions of others without getting to hear the evidence behind them. How should you revise your own opinions in such cases? Dietrich (2010) shows that, for opinions about objective chance, the method known as upco effectively adds your interlocutor’s evidence to your own. We provide a simple way of viewing upco that makes properties like Dietrich’s easy to appreciate, and we do three things with it. First, we unify Dietrich’s motivation for upco with another motivation due to Easwaran et al. (2016). Second, we show that laypeople can sometimes use upco to resolve expert disagreements. And third, we use it to cricitize the social argument for the uniqueness thesis.

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Author Profiles

Richard Pettigrew
University of Bristol
Jonathan Weisberg
University of Toronto, Mississauga

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References found in this work

Support for Geometric Pooling.Jean Baccelli & Rush T. Stewart - 2023 - Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (1):298-337.
Two mistakes about credence and chance.Ned Hall - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.
No one can serve two epistemic masters.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2389-2398.
Bayesian group belief.Franz Dietrich - 2010 - Social Choice and Welfare 35 (4):595-626.

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