Justified belief as an epistemic aim of education

Journal of Philosophy of Education 59 (1):1-13 (2024)
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Abstract

Critical thinking is considered to be a central epistemic aim of education. The claim may be about skills, but also about the state of justified belief. In opposition to this latter view, Alvin Goldman claimed that justification is only a means to true belief and that the only fundamental epistemic aim of education is true belief. Harvey Siegel’s response defended the view that justified belief is in fact a fundamental epistemic aim of education. In a recent article, Alessia Marabini and Luca Moretti analyse Siegel’s arguments, reject all of them, and provide two new ones. I defend one of Siegel’s arguments against their objection, raise some doubts about one of their own arguments, and give an additional argument against Goldman’s view.

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Jonas Pfister
University of Innsbruck

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References found in this work

Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Experts: Which ones should you trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.
Justification and truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.
Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-41.

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