Frege on the Tolerability of Sense Variation: A Reply to Michaelson and Textor

Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2024)
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Abstract

In several passages, Frege suggests that successful communication requires that speaker and audience understand the uttered words and sentences to have the same sense. On the other hand, Frege concedes that, in many ordinary cases, variation in sense is tolerable. In a recent article in this journal, Michaelson and Textor (2023) offer a new interpretation of Frege on the tolerability of sense variation according to which variation in sense is tolerable when the conversation aims at joint action, but not when the conversation aims at joint thought. We maintain, contra Michaelson and Textor, that whether sense variation is tolerable does not depend on the conversational purpose, whether it be theoretical or practical. Rather, whether sense variation is tolerable depends instead on the conversational background. This picture offers what we take to be a more plausible reconstruction of Frege’s own view.

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Author Profiles

Bryan Pickel
University of Glasgow
J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow

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References found in this work

Common ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5):701-721.
On sense and reference.Gottlob Frege - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 36--56.
Function and Concept.Gottlob Frege - 1997 - In David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 130-149.
Tolerating Sense Variation.Eliot Michaelson & Mark Textor - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):182-196.

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