Abstract

We defend a new, neurocognitive version of the view that knowing _that_ is a form of knowing _how_ and its manifestation. Specifically, we argue that knowing that _P_ is knowing how to represent the fact that _P_, ground such a representation in the fact that _P_, use such a representation to guide action with respect to _P_ when needed, store traces of such representations, and exercising the relevant know-how. More precisely, agents acquire knowledge via their neurocognitive systems and neurocognitive systems control organisms by building internal models of their environments and using such models to guide action. Such internal models _implicitly_ represent how things are. When agents’ implicit internal models are grounded in the fact that _P_ and are usable for guiding action with respect to _P_, agents have implicit knowledge that _P_. When agents acquire the additional capacity to manipulate language, they also acquire the capacity to _explicitly_ represent and express that the world is thus-and-so. When agents’ explicit internal models are appropriately grounded in the fact that _P_ and are usable for guiding action with respect to _P_, agents have explicit knowledge that _P_. Thus, both implicit and explicit knowing that _P_ are forms of knowing how to represent that _P_, ground such a representation in _P_, use such a representation to guide action with respect to _P_ when needed, store traces of such representations, and exercising the relevant know-how.