Actions as Inner Causes

In Causing Actions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2000)
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Abstract

Actions are mental events that typically cause bodily motions. This is strongly suggested by the semantics of causative constructions, like ‘She raised her hand’, which require event analyses. Objections to this view can be rebutted, while a range of intuitions about the individuation of actions are preserved, given the right conception of actions and action sentences.

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Paul Pietroski
Rutgers - New Brunswick

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