Conjoining Meanings: Semantics Without Truth Values

Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2018)
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Abstract

Paul M. Pietroski presents an ambitious new account of human languages as generative procedures that respect substantive constraints. He argues that meanings are neither concepts nor extensions, and sentences do not have truth conditions; meanings are composable instructions for how to access and assemble concepts of a special sort.

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Author's Profile

Paul Pietroski
Rutgers - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Theories of Meaning.Jeff Speaks - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Concepts at the Interface.Nicholas Shea - 2024 - Oxford / New York: Oxford University Press.
Semantics without semantic content.Daniel W. Harris - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (3):304-328.

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