Nudge to the future: capitalizing on illusory superiority bias to mitigate temporal discounting

Mind and Society 15 (2):247-264 (2016)
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Abstract

Policymakers and institutions have developed an increasing interest in applying principles from cognitive science to encourage individuals to adopt behaviors, attitudes and perspectives that enable them to reach higher levels of personal and collective well-being. We focused on the value of nudging people to adopt a broader farsighted view when making their day-to-day decisions, overcoming the temporal discounting bias which leads them to prefer smaller immediate gains to larger future rewards. Following recent advances in the literature, we tried to mitigate this myopia promoting the connection that individuals feel between their present and future selves through a nudge which capitalizes on their natural tendency to illusory superiority. We defined and tested a paradigm to exploit persuasively this optimistic bias to mitigate temporal discounting through the mediation of an increased future self-continuity. Implications for well-being and public policies are discussed.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Personal identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
Personal Identity.Derek Parfit - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.

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