Who Are My Parents? Why Assigning Moral Categories to Genealogical Relations Leads to More Confusion

American Journal of Bioethics 12 (9):28-30 (2012)
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Abstract

According to Haber and Benham (2012), a sufficient condition for full moral consideration is that a creature bears a genealogical relation to the Homo sapiens lineage. Since part-humans do not bear such a relation, they are not due full moral consideration on that basis. Given this argument, my aim in this commentary is twofold. First, I want to challenge its soundness by showing that it is possible for part-humans to bear a genealogical relation to the H. sapiens lineage. Second, I want to argue that Haber and Benham's attempt at avoiding moral confusion by reframing ethical concerns about part-humans doesn’t work.

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10.1080/15265161.2012.699144

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Monika Piotrowska
State University of New York, Albany

Citations of this work

Transferring Morality to Human–Nonhuman Chimeras.Monika Piotrowska - 2014 - American Journal of Bioethics 14 (2):4-12.

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References found in this work

Can there be vague objects?Gareth Evans - 1978 - Analysis 38 (4):208.
Can there be vague objects?Gareth Evans - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas, Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Crossing species boundaries.Jason Scott Robert & Françoise Baylis - 2003 - American Journal of Bioethics 3 (3):1 – 13.
Thinking about the human neuron mouse.Henry T. Greely, Mildred K. Cho, Linda F. Hogle & Debra M. Satz - 2007 - American Journal of Bioethics 7 (5):27 – 40.
Vagueness in reality.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman, The Oxford handbook of metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press.

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