L’argomento del “miracolo perpetuo” e i suoi sottintesi teologici. Ancora sui rapporti Leibniz-Malebranche

Laboratorio dell’ISPF (5):1-20 (2017)
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Abstract

The Argument of the “Perpetual Miracle” and its Theological Implications: on Leibniz-Malebranche Relationships. One of Leibniz’s strongest arguments against the Occasionalists is that, since they see all natural laws only as constant connections, Occasionalists are unable to distinguish a natural law from a constantly repeated miracle. The paper shows that Leibniz’s argument is not entirely adequate as a criticism of Malebranche, in that it stems from a theology that is quite different to that of Malebranche. For Malebranche, miracles are the effects of God’s “particular will” and are quite different even from God’s legal distribution of Grace. A miracle ruled by a law is, therefore, a conceptual impossibility. To Leibniz, miracles include everything that overrules creatures and their forces. Miracles may thus be governed by laws and, indeed, all miracles performed by God in our world are regulated by the laws of Leibniz’s Kingdom of Grace.

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Francesco Piro
Università degli Studi di Salerno

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