Abstract

As I use the term, externalism is the complement of internalism; the externalist denies that in order for one of my beliefs to have warrant for me, I must have some sort of special or privileged access to the fact that I have warrant, or to its ground. Recent epistemology has seen a flurry of interest in reliabilism, a particular species of externalism, and in this chapter, I examine three externalist and reliabilist accounts of warrant: those offered or suggested by William Alston, Fred Dretske, and Alvin Goldman. After introducing the notion of Alstonian justification, I point out that Alstonian justification is neither necessary nor sufficient for warrant. I then briefly outline Dretske's account of knowledge, Goldman's earlier version of reliabilism, and Goldman's later version of reliabilism. I conclude that the views of both Dretske and Goldman suffer because they fail to pay explicit attention to the notion of the proper function of our cognitive equipment.