Nietzsche’s Metaphysical Sketches

In Ken Gemes & John Richardson, The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche. New York: Oxford University Press (2013)
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Abstract

This article examines Nietzsche’s metaphysical reflections. Many of these reflections draw upon his rejection of regularity accounts of causation. Nietzsche thinks we cannot adequately understand causation without reference to causal powers, and he accepts a dynamist physics according to which the physical world is exhaustively constituted by powers, so that his ultimate ontology consists of a world of force-like rather than thing-like entities. This metaphysics underwrites his claim of the primacy of becoming over being. The article also suggests a genuine conflict in Nietzsche’s later thought, and that he was alternately drawn towards metaphysical indifferentism and panpsychist metaphysics in his late period.

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Peter Poellner
University of Warwick

Citations of this work

Nietzsche's Political Naturalism: Beyond Logocentrism and Anthropocentrism.Tvrtko Vrdoljak - 2024 - Journal of Social and Political Philosophy 3 (2):196-215.
Nietzsche's Naturalized Aestheticism.Matthew Meyer - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (1):138-160.

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