As novas concepções da matéria

Kairos: Revista de Filosofia and Ciência 7:187-197 (2013)
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Abstract

Poincaré tries to tackle the question "Can science sway us into materialism?". In other words, he analyzes if science - in particular Physics - and its theories are dependent on a materialistic ontological view of the world. His final answer appears to be "no". However, in order to reach this conclusion he resorts to a brief history of Physics, providing an insightful account on the evolution of the concept of atom from Democritus to the, then, recent discoveries on the composition of the atom. In his opinion, science swung and will keep swinging between two opposing approaches over the constitution of nature: the discrete and the continuous approach.

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