Abstract

FOR THE GREATER part of this century a certain dogmatic complex of analytic-linguistic philosophy has prevented philosophers of that persuasion from acknowledging the real foundation question. It has been taken for granted instead that the foundation question begins and ends with the fate of what has come to be called, in the last two decades, foundationalism. If the thesis of this essay should prove persuasive, it will reinforce the dominant conviction that foundationalism is unacceptable. But that is only incidental to my purpose. It is, however, essential to my purpose that two component dogmas of the complex are also principles of foundationalism. It will therefore be convenient to have before us the principles that appear to be common to the various versions of foundationalism: knowledge is a matter of justified true belief; knowledge consists of a system of propositions, and it is therefore these in which the knower has justified true belief; the justification of some of the propositions is direct, or immediate, and these are the foundational ones; the justification of the rest of the propositions is mediated by the foundational ones and so is indirect.