Werturteile AlS wissenschaftliche aussagen?

Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 5 (2):323-328 (1974)
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Abstract

It is the purpose to examine Krafts arguments and proofs on the basis of the evidence which gives reality. His derivation of principles with unlimited validity is not successful, judgements concerning "basic valuations of human culture" being inhomogeneous and historically bound. The way to introduce norms into scientific statements by "teleological" foundation is only valid for "normal" principles, basic must be excluded. The fruitfulness of the first step is appreciated and illustrated by economic examples. Jointly in connection with this is the third question. In accordance with Kraft, the "ranking" of value judgements of different kinds must be solved without privileges. Scientific examination and foundation of value systems has its legitimacy, but relevant decisions of basic principles can only happen in the pre-scientific sphere. In order to avoid other value judgements in scientific contexts, one ought to dispose of really operational criterions. Today, there is an almost complete lack in the practical field. This is partly due to theoretical and dogmatic interpretations of science procedures. Critical science has to accept the provisional character of all scientific research and must, therefore, integrate those value judgements, which result from not fully testable hypotheses. Their "internalization" into the scientific progress of knowledge allows together to delete a great deal of this crucial point

Other Versions

reprint Porstmann, Reiner (1974) "Werturteile als wissenschaftliche Aussagen?". Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 5(2):323-328

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