Personal Identity, a Philosophical Analysis [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 30 (4):775-776 (1977)
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Abstract

In a Wittgensteinian mood, Vesey argues that for ordinary usage there is no problem with concepts of personal identity. To understand this is to accept at the same time that there are various answers to specific problems of personal identity, and that a method suitable for one type of problem may not be suitable for others. However, there are key issues, and when they are emphasized to the extreme independently of one another logical conundrums and/or counter intuitive theories result. It is the purpose of Vesey’s clear analysis to avoid these while laying the ground work for fruitful general analysis.

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