Consciousness versus states of being conscious

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):155-156 (1997)
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Abstract

States of being conscious (S) can be defined on the basis of temporal information processing. A high-frequency mechanism provides atemporal system states with periods of approximately 30 msec to implement the functional connection of distributed activities allowing the construction of primordial events; a low frequency mechanism characterized by automatic temporal integration sets up temporal windows with approximately 3 seconds duration. This integration mechanism can be used to define S. P-consciousness and A-consciousness as conceived of by Block can be mapped onto these neuronal mechanisms.

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Responses to critics.Ned Block - 2025 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 110 (1):325-357.

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