Meaning Without Truth

Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013)
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Abstract

Stefano Predelli explores the relationships between semantic notions of meaning and truth. He develops a 'Theory of Bias' in order to approach notorious semantic problems, offers a solution to Quine's 'Giorgione' puzzle and a new version of the demonstrative theory quotation, and defends a bare-boned approach to demonstratives and demonstrations

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Stefano Predelli
Nottingham University

Citations of this work

Representing knowledge.Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (1):97-143.
Rules of Use.Indrek Reiland - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (2):566-583.
No context, no content, no problem.Ethan Nowak - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (2):189-220.

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