Belief Revision

In Doubt truth to be a liar. New York: Oxford University Press (2006)
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Abstract

This chapter discusses an account of belief-revision that is compatible with the rational belief of contradictions. In the process, a formal account of the model of rationality of the preceding chapter is provided. The account of belief-revision is contrasted with the familiar AGM account.

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Graham Priest
CUNY Graduate Center

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