Can Concept Empiricism Forestall Eliminativism?

Mind and Language 25 (5):612-621 (2010)
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Abstract

In this commentary, I focus on Machery's criticism of Neo-Empiricism. I argue that Neo-Empiricism can survive Machery's critique, and I show that there is an empiricist strategy for forestalling eliminativism

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Jesse J. Prinz
CUNY Graduate Center

Citations of this work

Conceptual fragmentation and the rise of eliminativism.Henry Taylor & Peter Vickers - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (1):17-40.
How Kant Justifies Freedom of Agency.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1695-1717.

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