Descartes, Kant, and self-consciousness

Philosophical Quarterly 31 (125):348-351 (1981)
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Abstract

Descartes maintained the doctrine attacked by hume and kant that the self is substance. Consciousness does not entail self-Consciousness for kant. The "i think" must be "capable" of accompanying my thoughts but does not constantly do so. What is necessarily true is that if I have an experience then it is mine, Not that I am conscious of it as mine. Pure apperception is a formal condition for experience, Not as a sort of introspection

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Stephen Priest
University of Oxford

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