Abstract

The most influential opponents of the embryo research and embryo experimentation claim that a person with the rights to life begins to exist at the moment of fertilization. They argue that such a scientific practices are tantamount to murder and, therefore, that thy are absolutely morally and legally impermissible The advocates of such a viewpoint appealed most frequently to three arguments with the purpose of supporting the stance that fertilization should be nominated as the time at which full moral status is acquired: Genetical Argument – at the “moment” of fertilization a genetically human being is created, Continuity Argument – in the post-fertilization period a continuum of developmental changes is such that it is impossible to isolate any stage to which we could attribute the attainment of moral status, Individuality Argument – it is the same individual right through from the moment of fertilization until the end. This article considers exclusively the question whether the Continuity Argument really supports the approach according to which fertilization is a determinant of moral status. I will try to show that from the most persuasive interpretation of Continuity Argument does not follow: that the fertilization is necessary determinant of moral status; that the fertilization is the most reasonable determinant of moral status. In short, I will try to show that this very argument does not entail the stance that embryo research and embryo experimentation are morally impermissible