Abstract

I examine two species of epistemic luck that I claim are not benign and explain how they feature in the main epistemological debates. The first species of epistemic luck—what I call ‘veritic’ luck—can be handled with a modest ‘relevant alternatives’ account of knowledge that is specifically defined so that it counters this type of epistemic luck. As I explain, such a theory is essentially a version of the safety-based neo-Moorean thesis that we looked at in Ch. 3. I develop this view by considering some of the main examples that are discussed in epistemology—such as Gettier examples, the ‘lottery’ puzzle, and ‘barn façade’ examples—and show how the neo-Moorean account can in each case generate the right result. Along the way the formulation of this anti-veritic-luck thesis is refined in response to potential challenges that might be presented to the view. Significantly, however, the chapter closes by arguing that there is a second species of epistemic luck—what I call ‘reflective luck’-that is epistemically problematic and that is not dealt with by the neo-Moorean account.