Conjunctions, Disjunctions and Lewisian Semantics for Counterfactuals

Synthese 156 (1):33-52 (2007)
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Abstract

Consider the reasonable axioms of subjunctive conditionals if p → q1 and p → q2 at some world, then p → at that world, and if p1 → q and p2 → q at some world, then → q at that world, where p → q is the subjunctive conditional. I show that a Lewis-style semantics for subjunctive conditionals satisfies these axioms if and only if one makes a certain technical assumption about the closeness relation, an assumption that is probably false. I will then show how Lewisian semantics can be modified so as to assure and even when the technical assumption fails, and in fact in one sense the semantics actually becomes simpler then

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Alexander R. Pruss
Baylor University

Citations of this work

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References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Papers in philosophical logic.David K. Lewis - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Possibility is not consistency.Alexander R. Pruss - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2341-2348.

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