The Badness of Being Certain of a Falsehood is at Least 1/(Log 4 − 1) Times Greater than the Value of Being Certain of a Truth [Book Review]

Logos and Episteme 3 (2):229-238 (2012)
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Abstract

Surprisingly precise results are provided on how much more one should disvalue being wrong than one values being right.

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Alexander R. Pruss
Baylor University

Citations of this work

From probabilities to categorical beliefs: Going beyond toy models.Igor Douven & Hans Rott - 2018 - Journal of Logic and Computation 28 (6):1099-1124.

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