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More on hyper-reliability and a priority
Abstract
In section III of Pryor 2006a, I argued against the view that the mere fact that a thought- type is hyper-reliable directly gives one justification to believe a thought of that type. A close alternative says that our merely appreciating that the thought-type is hyper-reliable directly gives us that justification.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
When warrant transmits.James Pryor - 2012 - In Annalisa Coliva (ed.), Mind, meaning, and knowledge: themes from the philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
What's Wrong with McKinsey-style Reasoning?James Pryor - 2007 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 177--200.
Existence hedges, neutral free logic and truth.Jan Heylen - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
References found in this work
There is immediate justification.James Pryor - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 181--202.
Free logics.Ermanno Bencivenga - 2002 - In D. M. Gabbay & F. Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2nd Edition. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 147--196.
Free Logics.Karel Lambert - 2001 - In Lou Goble (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 258–279.
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