Abstract

This thesis is an investigation of Aristotle's inquiry into the nature living substance. I contend that Aristotle's mature conception of living substance recognizes three points: the nature of living substance is best approached from the perspective of its 'existing'; a living substance must be considered to be a unity; and an adequate account of the nature of living substance must include the concept of emergence. I have approached this investigation from the perspective of the struggle in Greek philosophy to develop an adequate understanding of the nature of language and the way it refers to reality. The first part of the thesis traces the efforts of Plato and Aristotle to distinguish between the linguistic functions of the verb be and its use as a signifier for that which is primarily real. These efforts lead Aristotle to the recognition that what is primarily real is whatever constitutes the stative-durative existing of a substantial nature and, thus, substantial being must be approached from the perspective of its existing. The second part of the thesis examines the inquiry into that which constitutes the nature of substantial being, which Aristotle undertakes in Books Zeta and Eta of the Metaphysics. The key to the difficulties encountered there is the recognition that the verb be constitutes one part of a tripartite verbal system of be, come to be, and make to be, which underlies the way in which language refers to reality. Once Aristotle attempts to integrate the conflicting candidates for substantial nature as different ways of referring to a single, unitary nature the difficulties are resolved. The resulting, dynamic conception of living substance is one which accommodates the tripartite aspectual framework and reveals that the existential core of substantial being is a reflexive transformational activity to which the term emergence may justifiably be applied