Hume's Positive Argument on Induction

Noûs 48 (4):595-625 (2013)
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Abstract

Discussion on whether Hume's treatment of induction is descriptive or normative has usually centred on Hume's negative argument, somewhat neglecting the positive argument. In this paper, I will buck this trend, focusing on the positive argument. First, I argue that Hume's positive and negative arguments should be read as addressing the same issues . I then argue that Hume's positive argument in the Enquiry is normative in nature; drawing on his discussion of scepticism in Section 12 of the Enquiry, I explain a framework by which he provides what I call consequent justification for our inductive practices in his positive argument. Based on this, I argue that his negative argument in the Enquiry should similarly be read as normative in nature

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Hsueh Qu
National University of Singapore

Citations of this work

Hume’s practically epistemic conclusions?Hsueh Qu - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):501-524.
Hume’s Doxastic Involuntarism.Hsueh Qu - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):53-92.
Prescription, Description, and Hume's Experimental Method.Hsueh Qu - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (2):279-301.
Hume's Internalist Epistemology in EHU 12.Hsueh Qu - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):517-539.
Laying Down Hume's Law.Hsueh Qu - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):24-46.

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References found in this work

The sources of normativity.Christine Marion Korsgaard - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.
The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine Korsgaard - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384-394.
What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.

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