Rejoinder to Tuana

Philosophy of Science 45 (3):463-465 (1978)
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Abstract

Consider the two Duhemian theses S, according to which no single or individual theoretical hypothesis by itself has any observational consequences, and F, which states that no single theoretical hypothesis can be conclusively falsified by any observations.Does the truth of F follow from the truth of S? I had conjectured that Duhem may have thought so, but I argued that it does not [1]. Nancy Tuana contends that my argument misses the mark, and she goes on to argue that it does [2]. It seems to me that her arguments are decisive on this point, and so I welcome the correction.

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Quinn on Duhem: An emendation.Nancy Tuana - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (3):456-462.

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