The value of information and the value of awareness

Theory and Decision 80 (2):167-185 (2016)
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Abstract

Recent literature has examined the problem facing decision makers with bounded awareness, who may be unaware of some states of nature. A question that naturally arises here is whether a value of awareness, analogous to value of information, can be attributed to changes in awareness. In this paper, such a value is defined. It is shown that the sum VOA +\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$+$$\end{document} VOI is constant and, except for scale effects, independent of the choice set. It follows that the larger is VOA, the smaller is VOI. This point is illustrated for a simple two-state case, then proved for general classes of compact convex choice sets, and for alternative interpretations of the concept of unawareness.

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John Quiggin
University of Queensland

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The Moral Grounds of Reasonably Mistaken Self-Defense.Renée Jorgensen Bolinger - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):140-156.

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The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.John Von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern - 1944 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior.Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler - 1989 - Journal of Mathematical Economics 18 (2):141–53.

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