The simple duality: Humean passions

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (S1):98-116 (2012)
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Abstract

Hume views the passions as having both intentionality and qualitative character, which, in light of his Separability Principle, seemingly contradicts their simplicity. I reject the dominant solution to this puzzle of claiming that intentionality is an extrinsic property of the passions, arguing that a number of Hume’s claims regarding the intentionality of the passions (pride and humility in particular) provide reasons for thinking an intrinsic account of the intentionality of the passions to be required. Instead, I propose to resolve this tension by appealing to Hume’s treatment of the ‘distinctions of reason’, as explained by Garrett (1997).

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Hsueh Qu
National University of Singapore

Citations of this work

Hume on Mental Transparency.Hsueh Qu - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):576-601.
Fodor’s guide to the Humean mind.Tamás Demeter - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5355-5375.
Hume's Dispositional Account of the Self.Hsueh Qu - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):644-657.
Type distinctions of reason and Hume’s Separability Principle.Hsueh Qu - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (1):90-111.

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References found in this work

Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
Facing up to the problem of consciousness.D. J. Chalmers - 1996 - Toward a Science of Consciousness:5-28.
Cognition and commitment in Hume's philosophy.Don Garrett - 1996 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s Treatise.Annette Baier - 1991 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

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