The Modal Argument against Nominal Description Theory

Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):77-100 (2017)
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Abstract

The paper examines Loar’s and Bach’s defence of Nominal Description Theory against Kripkean Modal Argument (MA). Using formal tools of hyperintensional logic, I discriminate three kinds of nominal description which are possible substitutes for a proper name, thus considering various readings of the MA. On its natural understanding, the MA is valid – contrary to what Loar and Bach say. On the other hand, the soundness of the MA remains doubtful, as pointed out already by Loar and Bach.

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Jiri Raclavsky
Masaryk University

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