Abstract

The paper is a metaethical reflection on basic concepts in bioethics. It focuses on the concepts of autonomy and dignity and distinguishes what I take to be three central meanings of each that allow paring with each other. I show how these are all necessary for reflection about bioethical questions and complementary. Further reflection abounds into the role they are to play in bioethical discussions and the different levels of epistemic thickness that reflection in each case requires. Kant, Rawls and Habermas are central in this last sense. In reflecting upon these matters some poignant contemporary issues are addressed such as the attribution of dignity to potential super intelligences or the role of thick personal identities in bioethical reflection. One problem in bioethical discussions is that these different meanings and perspectives are not clearly distinguished and tend to be mixed with each other or considered in exclusive ways, this drives to confusion and sometimes superficial reflection. The paper shows the importance of taking all these perspectives simultaneously and how each one contributes to case analysis, as well as the need to alternate differing levels of epistemic concretion in so thinking. Conceptual analysis, with some historical basis, and metaethical considerations on formal epistemic aspects of bioethical thinking are the main methods used.