Relativism and truth: A rejoinder to Lynch

Philosophia 25 (1-4):423-428 (1997)
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Abstract

In a previous article appearing in _Philosophia, I claimed that metaphysical relativism (the world does not come presorted but rather symbol users impose taxonomies on it) does not entail truth relativism (statements are true only relative to a framework). Michael Lynch has said that the _argument I gave for this claim is defective. My argument uses the premise that truth relativism is inconsistent with the deflationary theory of truth. Lynch argues that this premise is false. However, I show that Lynch's argument misconstrues the deflationary theory. As a result, my premise remains unrefuted

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