Abstract

A new theory of the mind, the predictive processing model, is ascendant in recent work in cognitive science. According to this theory, all the mind ever fundamentally does is make hypotheses about the environment, generate prediction-errors by comparing its predictions with its sensory data, and use these prediction-errors to update its representation of the world. The theory of motivation and action to which the predictive processing model is committed has been the subject of lively debate in the literature. However, the upshots of the predictive processing model for the theory of practical reason have received relatively scant attention. Here I investigate how proponents of predictive processing should conceive of practical reason. The predictive processing model has it that the practical attitudes – desires and intentions etc. – reduce to certain theoretical attitudes – in particular, to beliefs and predictions. I argue that this psychological reduction precipitates a broader normative reduction, in which practical reasoning reduces to a kind of theoretical reasoning about what you will do, and in which practical normativity turns out to really be a species of epistemic normativity. In other words, that practical reason reduces to theoretical reason. If I am correct, the predictive processing model of the mind is committed to – what I am dubbing – a ‘radical cognitivism about practical reason’.