Good, Evil, and the Necessity of an Act

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):91-102 (2018)
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Abstract

Kant asserts that the formula of the schools “nihil appetimus, nisi sub ratione boni” is undoubtedly certain when clearly expressed. Conversely, doubt reflects a failure clearly to express it. Once we comprehend the concepts of the formula, of the good and of desire, there is no doubting it. In recent times, the formula has fallen into doubt. If Kant is right, then this shows a lack of clarity with respect to the concepts the formula conjoins. I want to suggest that Kant is right: the formula of the schools is undoubtedly certain. I first explain in Kant’s own terms why there is no such thing as doubting the formula. Then I approach it from a different angle, provided by what I take to be the unclarity that affects current thought on the topic.

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Sebastian Rödl
Universität Leipzig

Citations of this work

Demonic despair under the guise of the good? Kierkegaard and Anscombe vs. Velleman.Roe Fremstedal - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):705-725.
Kant and the “Old formula of the schools”.Robert B. Louden - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (1):63-74.

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References found in this work

Being Realistic About Reasons.Thomas Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grundlegung zur metaphysik der sitten.Immanuel Kant - 1785 - Gotha,: L. Klotz. Edited by Rudolf Otto.
The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263-275.

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