Conditionals Are Not Truth-Functional: An Argument from Peirce

Analysis 52 (1):5 - 12 (1992)
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Abstract

Peirce's example puts another nail in the coffin of the truth-functionality thesis. Conditionals are not truth-functional.

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Stephen Read
University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

Harmony and autonomy in classical logic.Stephen Read - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (2):123-154.
Quantifiers and 'if'-clauses.Kai von Finkel - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):209-214.
Hume and Peirce on the Ultimate Stability of Belief.Ryan Pollock & David W. Agler - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):245-269.
Quantifiers and 'If'‐Clauses.Kai Finkel - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):209-214.

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