The Fodorian fallacy

Analysis 62 (4):285-89 (2002)
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Abstract

In recent years Fodor has repeatedly argued that nothing epistemic can be essential to, or constitutive of, any concept. This holds in virtue of a constraint which Fodor dubs the Compositionality Constraint. I show that Fodor's argument is fallacious because it rests on an ambiguity.

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10.1111/1467-8284.00369

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Francois Recanati
Institut Jean Nicod

Citations of this work

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The notion of a recognitional concept and other confusions.Malte Dahlgrün - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):139 - 160.
Perceptual warrant and internal access.John Zeimbekis - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):191-206.

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References found in this work

Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Science and Values.Harold I. Brown & Larry Laudan - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (3):439.
Language, Thought and Compositionality.Jerry Fodor - 2001 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 48:227-242.

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