Abstract

A central aspect of the internal logic of Husserl's thought is unfolded by exploring a particular motivating factor: the ideal of a self-justifying science. The dissertation, in contrast with the standard interpretations, argues that the theme of self-justification is a unifying principle which guides Husserl's philosophical project and explains the development of his phenomenology. The Husserlian practice of self-justifying science was inspired by Weierstrass' rigorous mathematical analysis, and attempted to achieve the self-referential consistency of philosophical method and content. ;Part I, "Logic and Method," examines Husserl's early works and the Prolegomena to Pure Logic, tracing the growth and formulation of the self-justification problematic and its combination with Husserl's critique of empiricist epistemology. Part II, "Experience and Science," demonstrates the application of the standard of self-referential consistency in the structure and content of the six Logical Investigations proper, especially Investigations V and VI, and considers the program of "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" in relation to a self-justifying description of experience. Part III, "Method and Experience," compares the description and the performance of phenomenological method in Ideas I and shows how that method operates in a self-referentially consistent and self-justifying way. It is indicated, finally, that transcendental subjectivity is essential to the philosophical purpose of Husserl's phenomenology, and that self-referential consistency is fundamental in the articulation of the transcendental phenomenology of the later works as well