Taking the rationality out of probabilistic models

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (4):210-211 (2011)
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Abstract

Rational models vary in their goals and sources of justification. While the assumptions of some are grounded in the environment, those of others are induced and so require more traditional sources of justification, such as generalizability to dissimilar tasks and making novel predictions. Their contribution to scientific understanding will remain uncertain until standards of evidence are clarified

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