Only a Philosopher or a Madman: Impractical Delusions in Philosophy and Psychiatry

Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4):315-328 (2010)
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Abstract

Whether your scepticism is as absolute and sincere as you claim is something we shall learn later on, when we end this little meeting: we’ll then see whether you leave the room through the door or the window; and whether you really doubt that your body has gravity and can be injured by its fall—which is what people in general think on the basis of their fallacious senses and more fallacious experience. What Could Be more dissimilar than a well-argued philosophical thesis and a psychiatric delusion? Compare, for instance, Hume’s (1739) view that the self is nothing more than a “bundle” of perceptions with the psychiatric patient’s view that the thoughts in his head belong to someone else. Or, compare the ..

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Marga Reimer
University of Arizona

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