Experience as a Way of Knowing: The Knowledge Argument and Qualia

Journal of Human Cognition 8 (1):3-21 (2024)
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Abstract

It is first shown that many questions could be raised about phenomenal concepts and the popular answer to the question what Mary learns upon release, namely, that this is what it is like to see red. It is then shown that the category of quale is actually a postulate of philosophical theories and philosophers posit qualia because they fail to see how to account for the two related features of experience, namely, subjectivity and phenomenality. It is argued that we don't need qualia to explain the subjectivity and phenomenality of experience because we don't have to posit apparent properties. It is then proposed that experiencing is a way of knowing and that the new knowledge Mary acquires upon release is her knowledge by acquaintance with red.

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References found in this work

Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Thinking about Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):333-335.
Phenomenal knowledge.Earl Conee - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):136-150.
Physicalism and the cognitive role of acquaintance.Laurence Nemirow - 1990 - In William G. Lycan, Mind and cognition: a reader. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Mind and Illusion.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:251-271.

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